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‘There Is No Alternative’: Scotland’s Curriculum for Excellence and Its Relationship 




University of Edinburgh 
 
 
Abstract: This article uses the concept of high culture to assess the underlying 
assumptions and philosophy of Scotland’s Curriculum for Excellence (CfE). For the 
most part, these remain vague and unarticulated. This has two consequences. First, a 
consensus forms easily around CfE because it means different things to different 
stakeholders and is presented to teachers as a depoliticised and technocratic policy 
response. Second, because its core tenets are so hazy, it is extremely difficult to argue 
against. Although CfE is widely regarded to have at its heart some form of 
constructivism, the justification for such an approach is never articulated. By 
assessing CfE’s relationship with high culture, this article attempts to flush out its 
implicit core assumptions. Its central argument is that CfE cannot simultaneously 
please everyone. Perfectly justifiable alternative curricular paths have been 
abandoned. Far from being a technocratic and depoliticised policy response, CfE is in 
fact a much more controversial and ideological shift than the level of scrutiny it has 
thus far received would suggest. 
 
Key words: Scotland, education policy, curriculum, high culture, Curriculum for 
Excellence 
 
Scotland’s Curriculum for Excellence (CfE) enjoys widespread support not only from 
the four main Scottish political parties, but also from teachers’ unions, local 
authorities and official education bodies. This consensus also extends to university 
education departments: although there has been much criticism about the 
implementation of CfE, there is scarcely any dissent from the notion that it is a move 
in the right direction (but see Paterson, 2013). Indeed, it sometimes appears that there 
is not a single question in Scottish education to which CfE is not the answer. It will 
simultaneously: prepare students better for the world of work (Allan, 2014); help to 
close the attainment gap (Allan, 2015); improve literacy and numeracy (see, for 
instance, Scottish Government, 2008: 8); promote interdisciplinary learning (Scottish 
Government, 2008: 21); promote deep learning and subject disciplines (Education 
Scotland, 2015a); and make learning enjoyable (Education Scotland, 2015b). 
 This article argues that it is possible for the Scottish political, professional and 
academic consensus to bear the weight of these disparate aims because the underlying 
assumptions of CfE remain open to interpretation. The ‘Four Capacities’, for instance, 
are so vague and banal that it is hardly possible for any reasonable person to disagree 
with them. Although the underlying philosophy for CfE has been identified as 
constructivism (Priestley and Humes, 2010), I argue that not all of its CfE’s 
supporters can possibly subscribe to such a position. Moreover, the practical 
consequences of such a radical stance are never fully articulated. 
 This article aims therefore to sift through the confusion and flush out the core 
assumptions of CfE. It does so using the concept of high culture, which Matthew 
Arnold construes as ‘the best which has been thought and said in the world’ (Arnold, 
1990[1869]: 6). It assesses how far CfE supports the transmission of a body of 
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knowledge that might be considered ‘canonical’ and considers whether it accepts any 
basis upon which one piece of art may be judged to be superior to another. In doing so, 
I hope to start the process of moving towards a concrete definition of CfE that will 
allow it to be debated and evaluated. 
 This article proceeds in three stages. First, I briefly try to place CfE in the 
context of curricular reforms. It is presented as a technocratic and depoliticised policy 
response to the challenges of education in the twenty-first century. However, there is 
broad agreement that it has never been satisfactorily defined. Second, by examining 
its relationship with high culture, I derive six core CfE propositions. I argue that its 
uncontroversial packing conceals a radically relativist core. It also marks the decisive 
abandonment of the Scottish idea of the ‘democratic intellect’. Third, I discuss five 
possible justifications for a curriculum based on the six CfE principles I have 
identified. I conclude that it is logically impossible for CfE on its own to result in any 
improvement in attainment. Instead, it is just as likely that CfE will, at best, achieve 
nothing. There is also the danger that it will further entrench educational inequality. 
 
What is CfE? 
CfE reflects wider trends in international education policy. There has been a move 
away from the prescription of curricular content. Many countries now prefer to 
specify processes or experiences and give schools much more freedom to shape what 
is to be taught (Sinnema and Aitken, 2013). In Scotland, CfE emerged from a national 
debate about education. It was rooted in part in the idea that the curriculum was over-
prescribed and dominated by the demands of assessment. There has been a long 
process of implementation, which began in primary schools in 2010 (for a detailed 
discussion of the evolution of CfE, see Humes, 2013). 
 From the outset the exact philosophy and aims of CfE seem to have been 
confused (Gillies, 2006; Humes, 2013). Its dominant perspective, however, appears to 
be a form of constructivism (Priestley and Humes, 2010). Thus, although it is a 
mixture of different perspectives, it most closely resembles Muller and Young’s 
(2010) ‘Future 2’ curriculum ideal type. Future 1 describes a curriculum that is 
wedded to a traditional and conservative view of schooling, based on educating elites. 
It ignores modern innovations and its content becomes calcified and out-dated. A 
Future 3 scenario describes a curriculum that preserves the integrity of subject 
disciplines but is open to their continual refreshment and their being combined in 
order to introduce pupils to powerful knowledge and concepts. Finally, and most 
relevant for CfE, a Future 2 scenario is one in which there is a ‘steady weakening of 
boundaries, a de-differentiation of knowledge and institutions, a blurring of labour 
market sectors, and a greater emphasis on generic outcomes rather than inputs as 
instruments of equalisation and accountability (Muller and Young, 2010: 18). CfE 
most closely matches this description. 
Priestley and Biesta (2013) suggest that CfE embodies the values that they 
would associate with a ‘progressive’ approach to the curriculum. Thus, instead of the 
curriculum being a ‘selection from culture’ (Lawton, 1975), it is based on the ‘need 
for schools to develop approaches to active learning (although this concept is rarely 
explicitly spelled out) and emphasizes the role of teachers as co-learners, and as 
facilitators of student learning’ (Priestley and Biesta, 2013: 3). 
CfE is at the most basic level no more and no less than the removal of content 
from the curriculum and its replacement with a vague framework into which 
individual schools and teachers must reinsert knowledge of their choosing. It is 
important to keep this central fact in mind when assessing claims about improvements 
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in attainment as a result of CfE. We will consider below whether CfE also prescribes 
pedagogy in the absence of knowledge.  
 
CfE and High culture 
However, whilst it is possible to place CfE broadly in the context of wider curricular 
changes, it is much more difficult to arrive at a concise definition of what it is and 
what it is not. A recent OECD (2015: 38-45) report devoted five pages to discussing 
what CfE might be. It did not arrive at a firm conclusion.1 Instead, the OECD (2015: 
38) cautions that: ‘Any simple capsule description will ignore its complex multi-
dimensionality, and risks confounding the aspirational ideal with the variety of 
implementation on the ground.’ Thus, five years after the beginning of its 
implementation, ‘CfE’s scope still needs clarification’ (OECD, 2015: 11). 
This is a serious problem. Unless we pin down the boundaries of what is and what 
is not ‘CfE’, then it is impossible to assess it or discuss alternatives. As Gillies (2006: 
30) argues, the values of a curriculum should be explicit: ‘This is essential to permit 
proper examination of the basis to the curriculum, for it to be open to democratic 
challenge, and to permit any future modification and change.’ If anything is 
permissible under CfE, then it is not strictly a curricular reform; it is the removal of 
any notion of a curriculum. Like John Griffith’s famous observation about the British 
Constitution, CfE would simply be ‘what happens’ (quoted in King, 2007: 4). Since it 
is unlikely that policy-makers had this in mind, we are left with the task of trying to 
work out where the last curriculum ended and CfE began.  
One way to do this is to place the vague statements about CfE directly next to a 
more explicit stance and assess how far CfE differs. In this article, I propose to do this 
by deliberately contrasting CfE with Matthew Arnold’s notion of ‘the best which has 
been thought and said’ or ‘high culture’. I use this as a yardstick against which to 
measure the implicit assumptions of CfE. Since there is no explicit statement of its 
values and principles, we have to infer the core tenets of CfE from what is implied in 
its official documentation. 
I therefore suggest there are six propositions at the heart of CfE. These are 
deliberately designed to provoke and probe the limits of what CfE considers to be 
important. It may be that I am wrong in suggesting that one (or more) of these 
statements applies to CfE. However, I hope that these suggestions will allow us to 
move towards a clearer definition. If the true definition of CfE is so malleable that it 
cannot be captured, then it is impossible for it to fail. Every good piece of news or 
data may be used as evidence of its success; every bad piece of news can simply be 
put down to poor implementation. 
My six propositions are the following: 
 
1. It is perfectly acceptable for students to leave school with the impression that 
human civilization began around 1500. 
2. It is perfectly acceptable for students to leave school having never come 
across Shakespeare, Bach or Michelangelo. 
                                                 
1 Despite the report’s repeated statements about the limitations of its evidence and 
methodology (see, in particular, page 9: ‘This summary is not an evaluation of CfE, 
however, and indeed the evidence is not available for such an evaluation’ and page 
18: ‘…the evaluation of CfE as a programme has not been done’), the Scottish 
Government still presented it as an endorsement of CfE. 
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3. There is no common basis upon which we can say that one piece of art is any 
greater than another: Katie Price’s (2011) autobiography and Schubert’s 
Winterreise are of equal cultural value. 
4. Teachers have the broad and detailed disciplinary knowledge to be able to 
select the most appropriate content. 
5. Content is subservient to the skills to be taught. Students arrive at work or 
university with the same skills that they have acquired through (or regardless 
of) different content. 
6. There is no common Scottish (or indeed human) intellectual, cultural or 
literary inheritance that should be passed on to the next generation. 
 
I discuss each of these propositions in detail below. 
 
Proposition 1: It is perfectly acceptable for students to leave school with the 
impression that human civilization began around 1500. 
 
In CfE the academic discipline of history is subsumed within the broader theme of 
‘people, past events and societies’ (Scottish Government, 2010: 279). However, 
within this broad theme, CfE does not prescribe the particular ‘people, past events and 
societies’ that should be studied or in what order. It does not prescribe a chronology 
of events that would help students form a ‘schema’ or historical framework in which 
to accommodate new facts. Instead, the precise content or periods to be studied have 
to be selected by individual schools (see Scottish Government, 2010: 282-285). As 
Rata (2012: 131) points out, ‘In the absence of specific detail about content in 
subjects such as English and History, the student is left ‘thinking’, ‘understanding’, 
‘examining’, ‘exploring’ and all the other verbs that denote doing something with 
knowledge but without referring to the actual knowledge that is the raw material for 
the action.’ 
We are therefore led to conclude that CfE views history as a skills-based 
discipline and does not attach much importance to the periods of history to be studied 
or the order in which they should be studied. Two consequences flow from this. First, 
students might leave school with a detailed but unconnected knowledge of certain 
periods of history. Second, students might never be exposed to any history before the 
twentieth century, let alone the sixteenth. For instance, students are not required by 
CfE to learn anything about the ancient world and its cultural and intellectual 
achievements. This is up to individual schools and teachers to decide. One pupil 
might leave primary school with a detailed knowledge of the Wars of Independence; 
another’s history education might have begun with the Industrial Revolution. CfE 
does not distinguish between these two outcomes. Both are of equal educational value. 
 
Proposition 2: It is perfectly acceptable for students to leave school having never 
come across Shakespeare, Bach or Michelangelo.  
 
Proposition 3: There is no common basis upon which we can say that one piece of art 
is any greater than another: Katie Price’s autobiography and Schubert’s Winterreise 
are of equal cultural value. CfE adopts a radically relativist position. 
 
Propositions 2 and 3 address the relativism that implicitly underpins CfE. It does not 
prescribe content. Decisions about content are left to individual teachers and schools. 
CfE therefore necessarily rejects the idea that, for instance, there is an English literary 
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canon that should be taught to students. Decisions about the literary worth of a text 
cannot be made at a national level because there is no agreed basis on which to do this. 
Thus, instead of confronting the difficulty of deciding the texts or content to be taught, 
CfE devolves the issue to individual classrooms. 
 It is therefore perfectly possible under CfE to attend a school in which 
Shakespeare, Bach and Michelangelo are not part of the curriculum. Access to high 
culture might therefore be allocated according to a student’s postcode. It will depend 
entirely on how particular schools choose to use the freedom of interpretation they are 
given under CfE. As Muller and Young (2010: 23) argue, an under-stipulated 
curriculum may not present ‘insurmountable obstacles for well-resourced schools that 
are able to recruit teachers with strong subject qualifications who can fill in the gaps. 
It is, however, inevitably a problem for schools servicing poor communities that 
cannot attract such teachers.’ In Scotland, this may also lead to a widening gulf 
between different schools when it comes to high culture. Some schools (perhaps 
particularly private schools) will continue to teach the western canon in art, music and 
literature, even though they are not required by CfE to do so. Many schools will not.  
The purpose of CfE is therefore not to furnish minds with beauty. It does not 
seek, in its own terms, to fill pails with knowledge: it seeks instead to create minds 
that are empty but agile vessels for unspecified future learning. Any content will do. 
There is no need to trouble students with difficult works such as the plays of 
Shakespeare because CfE aims to teach them the decontextualised skills to be able to 
deal with any kind of text. It does not recognise the idea of a ‘canon’ of art or 
literature. 
 
Proposition 4: Teachers have the broad and detailed disciplinary knowledge to be 
able to select the most appropriate content. 
 
Accepting propositions 1-3 supposes certain attributes on behalf of teachers: first, that 
they have the time, skills and interest to design a syllabus from scratch; second, that 
they have the broad and deep disciplinary knowledge that will enable them to select 
an appropriate range of content. As we have noted, the wheel must be reinvented in 
every school because CfE does not provide a syllabus or suggested content. This has 
profound and unacknowledged consequences for students. Most importantly: the 
limits of a teacher’s knowledge become the limits of her students’ world. If your 
teacher has never heard of Bach’s St Matthew Passion, then neither will you. A 
McKinsey (2007) report famously noted that a school system cannot outperform its 
teachers. Neither can the knowledge content of CfE. 
Of course, if one supports the relativist underpinnings of CfE contained in 
propositions 1, 2 and 3, then this is unremarkable. If you think there are common 
points of western civilization with which all students should be familiar, then CfE 
presents serious problems. Without a common framework for assessing the value of 
human achievements or any notion that there might be people willing to assist in 
doing so (for instance, in universities), children’s access to high culture will be 
dependent on their teacher’s own education and taste. 
 
Proposition 5: Content is subservient to the skills to be taught. Content is subservient 
to the skills to be taught. Students arrive at work or university with the same skills 
that they have acquired through (or regardless of) different content. 
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CfE privileges skills over specific content. Children learn through an unspecified 
‘wide range of texts’ (Scottish Government 2010: 129). It does not matter therefore 
whether you learn about the use of metaphor through the works of John Donne or 
Dizzee Rascal. The end product is the same. CfE therefore suggests that different 
groups of pupils from different schools will not be disadvantaged as they enter the 
workplace or university. They will have learned the same skills through ‘active 
learning’, using different content. 
 Simone Weil considered George Herbert’s ‘Love (III)’ to be ‘the most 
beautiful poem in the world’ (quoted in Drury, 2014: 9). CfE cannot entertain such a 
proposition because it would require the acceptance of a hierarchy of cultural worth 
and consequently the suggestion that all children have a right to access its heights. 
CfE deliberately avoids such judgements and cannot find any basis upon which they 
might be imposed on schools from Edinburgh. In some federal systems of government, 
the central government allows states autonomy to innovate but also requires a 
minimum level of service for all citizens. In CfE there is no floor standard for 
knowledge, art, music or literature. 
 
Proposition 6: There is no common Scottish (or indeed human) intellectual, cultural 
or literary inheritance that should be passed on to the next generation. 
 
Aside from the requirement that students study one Scottish text during Higher 
English, CfE has no sense of the importance of passing on a common intellectual or 
cultural heritage. For Newton, we see further by standing on the shoulders of giants. 
For CfE, there is no compelling case for the teaching of one specific body of 
knowledge over another. In a country such as Scotland, a case might be made for the 
value of the study of the thinking of the Scottish Enlightenment. However, in 
Scotland, access to Hume and Smith depends on teachers’ knowledge. They would 
only be included if they are deemed relevant to the skills to be imparted in a particular 
lesson. That this does not matter provided that students have learned appropriate 
transferable skills is a central CfE proposition. If CfE is successful in this regard, then 
no 18-year-old Scottish undergraduate should have the knowledge necessary to take 
part in University Challenge. Instead, she will have a stock of transferable skills 
designed to ensure that she contributes to the country’s economic growth. 
 
Justifying CfE 
Having set out what I take to be the principles that underpin CfE, I now turn to look 
briefly at possible arguments that might be made in favour of them. I suggest there are 
five possible justifications for CfE: 
 
1. Schools need to employ new pedagogies in order to teach better. 
2. The selection of content is too difficult and controversial, so it should be left 
to individual schools and teachers. 
3. The twenty-first century requires a different kind of curriculum. 
4. Schools should prepare children for the workforce. 
5. CfE will help to close the attainment gap. 
 
I will now examine each of these arguments in turn. 
 
1. Schools need to employ new pedagogies in order to teach better. 
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In common with other process-based curriculums, in place of content, CfE does 
appear to prescribe pedagogy (Rata, 2012). For instance, the core CfE document 
recommends ‘active’ learning in numeracy (Scottish Government, 2010: 40). In 
promoting this as a recommended technique, CfE enters a highly contested area. The 
meaning of ‘active learning’ is defined in broad and vague terms: ‘Active learning is 
learning which engages and challenges children's thinking using real-life and 
imaginary situations’ (Education Scotland, 2016a) However, once again, we may 
infer a more concrete definition from other CfE materials. Rote learning is 
discouraged; instead, learning should be more ‘fun’ and ‘relevant’ (see, for instance, 
Education Scotland 2016a). CfE best practice case studies suggest that teachers 
should use games or project-style activities to involve students in their learning. 
However, the evidence on the effectiveness of this type of teaching is not 
clear-cut (see, for instance, Kirschner et al., 2006). Indeed, a recent report into 
effective teaching practice concluded in relation to active learning that:  
This claim is commonly presented in the form of a ‘learning pyramid’ 
which shows precise percentages of material that will be retained when 
different levels of activity are employed. These percentages have no 
empirical basis and are pure fiction. Memory is the residue of thought 
(Willingham, 2008), so if you want students to remember something 
you have to get them to think about it. This might be achieved by being 
‘active’ or ‘passive’ (Coe et al., 2014: 24). 
Such reservations are not acknowledged in the CfE documentation and the promotion 
of ‘active’ learning is treated as a positive and obvious development in teaching 
practice. The danger of learning through projects or games is that children concentrate 
more on the process of the task, rather than on the material to be learned (Willingham, 
2009: 53-54). They become experts on the intricacies of computer software, rather 
than on the topic of the geography lesson. In reality, the evidence for the effectiveness 
of ‘active’ learning is not compelling enough for it to be presented as best practice by 
the national curriculum. If a change in pedagogy is a central justification for CfE, then 
it is not a very strong one. 
Glasgow City Council’s education policy document also prescribes attention 
to pupils’ learning styles and multiple intelligences. Specifically: ‘Young people 
should be supported in recognising their own learning style’ (Glasgow City Council, 
2012: 6). There are perhaps few educational theories that have been as 
comprehensively discredited as learning styles (for a summary of the evidence, see 
Riener and Willingham, 2010). Yet the permissive and vague tone of national CfE 
documents allows such myths to be presented to teachers as best practice at the local 
authority level. 
 
2. The selection of content is too difficult and controversial, so it should be left to 
individual schools and teachers. 
 
One of the justifications for the lack of content is that it helps to promote the 
professionalism and autonomy of teachers (although such an outcome is often 
conflated with the promotion of the interests of pupils). Such a proposition is highly 
debatable. In the case of CfE, for instance, surely there is an argument for saying that 
a teacher’s autonomy is undermined as much by prescription of pedagogy as by 
prescription of content? If the content to be taught must be left to the teacher’s 
professional judgement, then why not also the best way to teach it? On what basis 
does CfE prescribe pedagogy but not content? In this context, it seems perfectly 
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logical to argue, conversely, that when content is prescribed, this frees teachers from 
the burden of designing a separate syllabus for each and every school in Scotland, 
enabling them to use their professional judgement about how best to teach. In any 
case, it is difficult to see the merit in CfE prescribing forms of pedagogy for which 
there is little, if any, empirical evidence. 
 Another justification for the absence of content in CfE is that the selection of 
what is to be taught is inevitably difficult and controversial. For Priestley and Humes 
(2010: 348), for instance, a central question is: ‘By whom? Despite epistemological 
attempts to define essential knowledge or to select from essential culture, such 
decisions remain fundamentally political and ideological.’ Quite. However, those who 
make this argument appear to suggest that CfE provides some kind of solution to this 
problem. It does not. It merely avoids the question. It is content to ignore this 
fundamental and difficult issue provided content choices are made according to the 
ideology (or whims) of individual schools and teachers, rather than considered at a 
national level. It is not clear how this is any less controversial or problematic. 
 
3. The twenty-first century requires a different kind of curriculum. 
4. Schools should prepare children for the workforce. 
 
Much of the justification for CfE seems to be based on a questionable interpretation 
of the demands of the twenty-first century. For instance, in his foreword to a major 
report, the Senior Chief Inspector of Schools reflected that: ‘Scotland’s future 
economic prosperity requires an education system within which the population as a 
whole will develop the kind of knowledge, skills and attributes which will equip them 
personally, socially and economically to thrive in the 21st century’ (HM Inspectorate 
of Education, 2009: 1). Education Scotland (2016b) also states that there is the ‘need 
to prepare our young people for life and work in an increasingly uncertain and rapidly 
changing economic and social environment.’ Again, Glasgow City Council provides a 
telling example of how the fuzzy aims of CfE are interpreted on the ground. The 
introduction to its education strategy document states: 
In the 21st Century we are preparing children and young people for a 
future world that we don’t yet know, for jobs that don’t yet exist and 
for a life that may be very different to today’s way of living. The 
technological and information age continues to do so well into the 
future. Glasgow’s children and young people deserve to be given the 
best possible opportunities to develop skills and attitudes which will 
serve then well throughout their lives. These include the ability to 
solve problems, to be creative and adapt to a changing environment, to 
apply new knowledge, to work and interact effectively with others and 
to be resilient in the face of adversity (Glasgow City Council, 2012: 1). 
As an introductory statement of the aims of teaching and learning, this is at best 
problematic. It is not at all clear that the twenty-first century changes anything. Did 
the ancient Greeks not apply new knowledge? Did the Victorians build the railways 
without working and interacting effectively with others? Was the World War Two 
generation not resilient in the face of adversity? There is surely just as strong a case 
for arguing that the knowledge of subject disciplines is likely to serve Glasgow’s 
children well into the future. Ben Goldacre, for instance, accepts that recent scientific 
discoveries might change our view of certain things. However: 
Whilst this is true at the bleeding edges of various research fields, it’s 
worth bearing in mind that Archimedes has been right about why 
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things float for a couple of millennia. He also understood why levers 
work, and Newtonian physics will probably be right about the 
behaviour of snooker balls forever (Goldacre, 2009: 237). 
The over-excited view of the twenty-first century and the ‘anything goes’ attitude of 
national CfE documents mean that there is a serious danger that wide gaps will exist 
in children’s knowledge, both within and between schools. Although there are 
frequent statements about the teaching of knowledge in CfE documents (Priesley and 
Sinnema, 2014: 65-66), this is potentially in conflict with notions of ‘twenty-first 
century’ skills. This tension remains unresolved and open to interpretation. As 
Priestley and Sinnema (2014: 71) note, CfE has ‘greatly reduced the specification of 
content, de-emphasised the importance of knowledge in relation to other aspects 
(skills, competencies, etc.), and failed to provide explicit guidance on processes to the 
practitioners charged with developing them’. Thus, although high-level CfE 
statements continue to emphasise the importance of knowledge, the overall message 
is ambiguous. In the absence of explicit guidance to the contrary, therefore, a 
reasonable interpretation of CfE is that it is more important to concentrate on the 
‘how’, rather than the ‘what’ of learning. 
This is a particular problem in schools where teachers lack deep disciplinary 
knowledge or where they imagine that knowledge is of secondary importance in the 
twenty-first century. In fact, as Hirsch argues, the opposite is the case: 
There is a consensus in cognitive psychology that it takes knowledge 
to gain knowledge. Those who repudiate a fact-filled curriculum on the 
grounds that kids can always look things up miss the paradox that de-
emphasising factual knowledge actually disables children from looking 
things up effectively. To stress process at the expense of factual 
knowledge hinders children from learning to learn. Yes, the Internet 
has placed a wealth of information at our fingertips. But to be able to 
use that information – to absorb it, to add to our knowledge – we must 
already possess a storehouse of knowledge. That is the paradox 
disclosed by cognitive research (Hirsch, 2000: 2). 
CfE is thus in danger of permitting a slimmed down curriculum where children are 
not encouraged to learn the bank of facts stored in long-term memory that are 
essential for critical thinking. As Daniel Willingham argues, ‘Factual knowledge must 
precede skill’ (Willingham, 2009: 25). 
CfE also ties itself in knots in order to try to come up with a ‘future-proof’ 
definition of a text: ‘a text is the medium through which ideas, experiences, opinions 
and information can be communicated’ (Scottish Government, 2010: 23). This is an 
eccentric exercise but it reveals a great deal about the thinking behind CfE. Did the 
writers of this document seriously imagine that Scotland’s schools were in danger of 
producing students who could read novels and poems but struggle with text messages 
and emails? The danger is surely that the reverse is true. And even if it were not, 
could the authors of this document not imagine a case for schools as places of 
academic learning where the demands of the modern office or everyday life are 
subservient (for at least a few years of a child’s life) to the exploration through 
literature of what it means to be a human being? Are novels and poems in imminent 
danger of being replaced? 
Finally, for those students who progress to university and more independent 
learning, does the twenty-first century require a different sort of curriculum? Again, 
the evidence for this is not compelling. First, as Daniel Willingham has pointed out, 
‘Research from cognitive science has shown that the sorts of skills that teachers want 
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for students – such as the ability to analyse and think critically – require extensive 
factual knowledge’ (Willingham, 2009: 25, emphasis in original). CfE is silent on the 
importance of memorising facts. 
Second, perhaps the vast majority of university studies continue to be fairly 
traditional. An expert will introduce the topic via a series of lectures. There will be a 
reading list of standard works on the topic (perhaps including a textbook) and the 
lecturer will try to show how thinking has subsequently developed. Students will have 
to write coherent essays and, most likely, sit an unseen exam. Students will be 
penalised for poor writing. There is just as strong an argument, therefore, that the best 
possible preparation for university is a broad knowledge of academic disciplines and 
extended practice of writing scholarly essays in standard written English. 
 
5. CfE will help to close the attainment gap. 
 
Considering all that we have discussed so far, this is the oddest of the claims made on 
behalf of CfE. In order to sustain such a proposition, we would have to accept that the 
poorest children were being held back by a combination of traditional teaching 
methods, overly prescribed content and a lack of interdisciplinary learning. There is 
little evidence for this. Indeed for CfE to result in any improvements in educational 
attainment, we would need to suppose that poorly performing schools in Scotland 
were struggling because their teachers were being denied the freedom to implement 
the superior curriculum that was inside their heads all along.  
As we have noted, the CfE documentation is a study in vagueness: you could 
use it to justify the teaching of Ancient Greek to primary 4 or the necessity of 
scrapping subject disciplines. In many cases it is as good as having no curriculum at 
all. This means that the schools with the best teachers (those who were doing fine 
anyway) will continue to thrive. Those schools that were struggling have just had the 
most prescriptive guidance removed. It is not clear how this can possibly result in 
significant educational improvement. 
It is perfectly possible, however, that CfE will create or entrench gaps between 
children from the richest and poorest homes. Some students will leave school able to 
listen to BBC Radio 4’s Start the Week and understand most of the literary and 
cultural allusions therein; others will never have this cultural understanding because 
their teachers’ interpretation of CfE privileged the playing of games and the 
development of skills over the acquisition of knowledge. Some students will be able 
to read a leader article in The Economist and recognise the references to British and 
American political history; others will be excluded from elite conversations about the 
future of politics. CfE does not even attempt to close this gap. 
 
Conclusion 
I have attempted to clear away some confusion concerning the principles and 
purposes of Scotland’s Curriculum for Excellence. CfE is insulated from empirical or 
philosophical refutation because it is never satisfactorily defined. It is the dominant 
discourse in Scottish education, but it means different things to different people. By 
analysing its relationship with the concept of high culture, I have identified six 
propositions that appear to underlie CfE. CfE’s philosophical position is radically 
relativist. 
 However, the implications of this position are rarely acknowledged. Teachers 
select content from a free market of ideas. Unpopular ideas and content wither and 
fail in this intellectual marketplace. Similar arguments are made by right-wing think 
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tanks to oppose state subsidy of the arts. In the free market of ideas created by CfE, 
schools are free to innovate. However, they are also free to fail. It is therefore far from 
clear that CfE will lead to any improvements in Scottish education. Those schools that 
have always taught the Western canon in art, music and literature can continue to do 
so (the curriculum documentation is so vague as to permit anything). It is not clear 
what the others have been freed from. 
In its refusal to justify learning in anything but an instrumental sense, CfE 
represents a final triumph of market liberalism in Scottish education. Curiously for the 
home of the Enlightenment, Scotland in 2017 appears to lack the intellectual self-
confidence to defend the emancipatory and transformational power of knowledge. It 
prefers instead to justify its curriculum on the grounds that it will help young people 
on the ‘job market’ and furnish them with the skills needed for the twenty-first 
century. This unconditional surrender to the logic of the market is one of the most 
depressing elements of CfE. It would be unrecognisable to previous generations of 
great Scottish education reformers whose credo was the democratic intellect (Davie, 
1961). 
 Finally, even if the central intention of CfE is to standardise pedagogy rather 
than content, then, again, it is not clear that it will lead to improvement. The claims 
made on behalf of the kind of ‘active’ learning promoted by CfE are, at best, 
contested. The CfE documentation does not acknowledge these shortcomings and in 
prescribing a preferred pedagogy arguably undermines teachers’ autonomy and 
professionalism in exactly the way its supporters allegedly aspire to avoid. 
 At best, therefore, CfE will achieve little of real educational value. Those 
schools that performed well already have the freedom to continue to do so. At worst, 
it will further entrench the divide between those with access to high culture and those 
without. There is no compelling reason to imagine that it will on its own lead to a 
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